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For more than fifty years, North American Aerospace Defense Command 
(NORAD) has been responsible for conducting aerospace warning and control missions 
for the defense of North America. In accomplishing those operations, Commander 
NORAD is responsible for making the official warning to both the president of the 
United States and the prime minister of Canada if North America is suddenly under 
aerospace attack. 
Now, with the dramatic increase in worldwide cyberspace events, NORAD has 
begun examining its own potential role within this new domain. Would involving 
NORAD in the military cyber attack warning process, leveraging its unique and proven 
binational structure, provide any advantages to both nations? 
To analyze this question, this thesis briefly traces NORAD’s warning mission 
history, discusses the basic concepts involved with “cyber attacks,” identifies key U.S. 
and Canadian military cyber organizations, and examines significant U.S. and Canadian 
cyberspace government policies. It then proposes three potential new courses of action 
for NORAD, identifying advantages, disadvantages, and proposed solutions to 
implementation.  
The thesis ends by recommending NORAD advocate for unrestricted cyberspace 
national event conference participation. This would be a realistic, achievable first step 
offering significant improvement in both NORAD’s cyber attack situational awareness, 
as well as improving overall operational responsiveness.  
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Since 1958, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has a 
proven history of adapting and evolving to meet changing military defense challenges 
using new technology—from its early years providing ground-based radar warning of 
approaching Soviet bombers, to ground-based radar warning of in-bound Soviet ICBMS, 
to satellite-based warning of any missile launch occurring around the world, to extended 
radar warning of approaching cruise missiles, to the warning of suspect maritime vessels 
approaching North America. Overall, NORAD has sole responsibility for receiving early 
warnings from numerous space-based and ground-based sensors and developing an 
integrated North American attack assessment.  
Because all of the sensors feeding into NORAD travel across the broader 
“information superhighway,” there exists a genuine risk of potentially hostile nations 
conducting damaging cyberspace operations against NORAD (to include blinding 
NORAD to actual threats or feeding the Command false information for incorrect action.) 
With the recent increase in worldwide cyberspace events, NORAD has thus begun 
examining its own potential role in this new operational domain. 
An exact definition regarding what constitutes a “cyber attack” remains in flux. 
Despite this lack of definition, however, both the U.S. and Canada have been quick to 
establish new, dedicated military organizations specializing in conducting cyberspace 
operations. Further, current military cyberspace event conferences now share warning 
information between U.S. Combatant Commands around the world, to include the 
NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center. (One area of concern: current U.S. 
classification policies restrict the sharing of certain classified information with Canadian 
NORAD members.) 
Over the course of 50 years, NORAD has repeatedly reassessed, redefined, and 
updated its core operational missions based upon a constantly evolving threat. The 
NORAD Agreement clearly reflects both Nation’s desire that NORAD be able to adapt 
and defend against newly evolving military threats which each nation may jointly face.  
 xviii
Likewise, numerous U.S. and Canadian national strategies recommend working 
with international organizations to develop international watch-and-warning networks in 
order to detect and prevent cyber attacks. U.S. military policy encourages the necessity to 
integrate allies early in planning discussions in order to reduce operational boundaries, 
thus increasing the chances of success in combined operations. Finally, from a Canadian 
perspective, both Canada’s civilian and military strategies mirror the same themes of 
working with international organizations to develop international watch-and-warning 
networks in order to detect and prevent cyber attacks.  
With this background in mind, this thesis developed three courses of action 
(COAs) regarding possible roles NORAD might play in future military cyber attack 
warning situations. Each proposed COA was initially analyzed to ensure it met specific 
validity criteria (e.g., adequate, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete.) 
COAs were then arranged by increasing levels of responsibility being placed upon 
NORAD. Each COA was then examined for specific advantages, disadvantages, and 
possible solutions for successful implementation. 
After considering these three COAs, this thesis proposes NORAD advocate for 
unrestricted national cyberspace event conference participation. This would seem to be a 
realistic, achievable first step that offers significant improvement in NORAD cyber attack 
situational awareness and improved operational responsiveness, while requiring only a 
change in DOD information classification policy for implementation. Allowing NORAD 
Canadian personnel to fully participate in real-time cyber event conferences would fulfill 
stated U.S. and Canadian national policies, which repeatedly highlight the need for 
greater cooperation and information sharing with between allies. 
In conclusion, while requiring challenging staff actions nationally within DOD 
and internationally with Canada to provide unrestricted access to cyberspace operations, 
the recommended action harnesses proven NORAD binational relationships and warning 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
For more than fifty years, North American Aerospace Defense Command 
(NORAD) has been responsible for conducting aerospace warning and aerospace control 
for North America. These two aerospace missions involve the combined efforts of 
military forces of both the U.S. and Canada to detect airborne threats approaching or 
flying within North America (aerospace warning), and then taking appropriate actions to 
determine the aircraft of interest’s actual intentions (aerospace control). The commander 
of NORAD is responsible for making an official assessment to the president and the 
Canadian prime minister if North America is under aerospace attack. 
Similarly, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) is responsible for defending 
the U.S. military’s cyberspace enterprise. The commander of USCYBERCOM is 
responsible for making an official assessment to the president if the U.S. military is under 
cyber attack. Would involving NORAD in the military cyber attack assessment process, 
leveraging its unique and proven binational structure, provide any advantages? 
This thesis explores a new NORAD role in cyberspace defense, which is not one 
of its legacy air defense missions. However, there exists precedence for adding a new, 
non-aerospace related mission to NORAD; that being, the addition of the Maritime 
Warning mission to NORAD in 2006. 
With cyber attacks by nation-states on the rise, this thesis investigates if there is 
an advantage in involving the assessment of military cyber attacks with a binational 
military command. Potential advantages may include operational efficiencies, improved 
cyberspace defense readiness, and/or enhanced situational awareness of a precursor 
cyberspace attack before any kinetic attack upon North America. Disadvantages may 
involve difficulties sharing cyberspace defense information between U.S. and Canadian 
cyberspace defense agencies, or an actual lessening of operational effectiveness of 
USCYBERCOM cyberspace defense operations themselves. 
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B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis specifically focuses on the military cyberspace enterprise, and how 
NORAD and the individual military organizations of both the U.S. and Canada might 
jointly conduct military cyber attack warning. Therefore, no review was conducted of 
civilian cyberspace-related policies or strategies published by either by the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or Department of Justice (DOJ), or by 
Canada’s Public Safety (PS) Canada. 
This problem statement also does not propose having NORAD assume the 
technical cyberspace defensive/offensive functions performed by USCYBERCOM. The 
thesis simply asks, “What is NORAD’s role when assessing whether the U.S.’ and/or 
Canada’s military are under a military-related cyber attack?” 
The question of whether NORAD should play a role in cyber attack warning does 
not seem to have been investigated previously. A literature review identifying the 
significant national cyberspace policies for both the U.S. and Canada has been 
accomplished, as well as a review of the key military strategies for cyberspace published 
by both countries. Literature outlining strategic cyberspace policies and general strategies 
of both the U.S. and Canada are well defined and unclassified. Military doctrine 
regarding cyberspace operations is also available, but details become classified as 
discussions become more technically oriented. 
Every five years, NORAD conducts an internal self-assessment to determine if the 
Command is accomplishing the right missions, using the right approaches. Recently the 
headquarters staff began its investigation regarding NORAD’s role in cyberspace 
defense, and expressed great interest and willingness to support this research. This thesis 
used existing documentation as well as dialogue with Headquarters NORAD and 




This thesis then developed three courses of action, and outlined their advantages 
and disadvantages. It then proposed solutions for each disadvantage, and weighted the 
difficulty of implementing each solution. For each course of action, a numerical score 
was then assigned. The lowest score indicated an option potentially easier to implement, 
while a high scoring option was potentially more difficult. 
Overall, the cyber warning topic is important, valuable, relevant, and enduring. 
The eventual goal is to present this completed thesis to the NORAD Strategy and Policy 
Division for subsequent staff action. 
C. THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter II opens with an operational overview, beginning with a short history of 
NORAD’s evolving warning missions. The chapter then discusses cyber warfare 
components and includes a discussion regarding the difficulty of defining what is meant 
by a “cyber attack.” Next, the chapter lists key U.S. and Canada military organizations 
involved in national cyberspace operations. The chapter closes with a review of differing 
military cyber event conferences. 
Chapter III reviews current NORAD, U.S., and Canadian military policy 
regarding cyberspace operations, providing the reader numerous examples of national 
strategic guidance directing greater cooperation between both nations. 
Chapter IV lays out three proposed courses of action (COA) for NORAD, from 
removing classification barriers to allow better information sharing, to fusing and 
disseminating all-domain threat warnings to both nations, to jointly participating with 
U.S. Cyber Command in assessing actual cyber attacks. Each COA is then examined for 
advantages, disadvantages, and proposed solutions for implementation. 
Chapter V then analyzes each COA using a weighted scoring methodology to 
determine the relative difficulty in implementing each course of action. A lower score 
indicated an option potentially easier to implement, while a higher scoring option was 
potentially more difficult. 
Chapter VI concludes with the overall findings and a recommendation. 
 4
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II. OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to consider what role NORAD might play in military cyber attack 
warnings, we first need a general understanding of several fundamental topics. This 
chapter will briefly review the history of NORAD and its evolving military warning 
missions. Next, cyber warfare components and several proposed definitions for what a 
“cyber attack” might actually involve will be reviewed. Then, key U.S. and Canada 
military organizations involved in military cyber warfare will be highlighted. Finally, the 
chapter closes with a review of current military cyberspace attack conferences and the 
military cyberspace attack assessment process. 
B. TRADITIONAL NORAD WARNING MISSIONS 
1. Early North American Air Defense Warning 
With the beginning of the Cold War during the late 1940s, American defense 
experts began planning a new, comprehensive air defense strategy they believed was 
critical in defending the U.S. against attacks by long-range Soviet Union strategic 
bombers. Led by the U.S. Air Force’s newly established “Air Defense Command” 
(created in 1948), regional commands were charged with protecting various areas of the 
U.S. from bomber attacks.1  
In August 1949, the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb under project 
“First Lighting.”2 The test shocked the Western powers, as the American intelligence 
community had previously estimated the Soviets would not develop an atomic weapon 
until 1953, at the very earliest.3  It was now predicted the Soviet Union would soon have 
the means to drop atomic weapons on the U.S. using long-range strategic bombers. 
                                                 
1 NORAD History Office, Brief History of NORAD, (Colorado Springs, CO: 31 Dec 2012).  
2 Carey Sublette, “The Soviet Nuclear Weapons Program,” The Nuclear Weapons Archive, last 
modified 12 December 2007, http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/Sovwpnprog.html.  
3 Ibid. 
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Thus, as concerns about Soviet nuclear capabilities became dire, in 1954 the 
Department of Defense formed a new, multi-service command called “Continental Air 
Defense Command” (CONAD) involving Army, Naval, and Air Force forces. As their 
service contribution, the Air Force provided interceptor fighter aircraft and agreed to 
operate an extensive array of arctic distant early warning radar sites which would act as a 
“trip wire” against any surprise Soviet bomber attack launched over the North Pole.  
In addition, new defense agreements between Canada and the United Stated were 
negotiated, centering on building three series of long-range ground radar warning sites 
across Canada—the southern “Pinetree Line,” the “Mid-Canada Line,” and the famous 
northern “Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line.” (See Figure 1.) 
 
 




                                                 
4 Tom Page, “Alaskan DEW Line Sites,” Radomes, Inc., accessed 20 Apr 2015, 
http://www.radomes.org/museum/alaskadew.php. 
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Based upon the remarkable success of these joint United States-Canadian radar 
construction efforts, in late 1957, the U.S. and Canada then jointly agreed to create an 
innovative “North American Air Defense Command” (NORAD), merging the operational 
control of both United States and Canadian air defense forces under a single, 
multinational military command. 




The two nations formalized this mutual air defense arrangement in a new, 
binational defense agreement to be known as the “NORAD Agreement.” The NORAD 
Agreement, with its requirement for periodic review every five years, ensured the United 
States and Canada the flexibility to adapt the new Command to any changes in the 
defense environment over the coming years. 
 
 
                                                 
5 NORAD History Office. 
6 Ibid. 
Figure 2.  Original NORAD “Air” Emblem of 1958.6
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2. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Warning 
Adding to the continental defense challenge, Soviet engineers soon developed a 
new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of delivering small, newly 
developed hydrogen bomb warheads. Thus, long range missile attacks now became a 
critical defense problem, as NORAD’s vast line of arctic air defense radar sites could 
now “not only [be] outflanked, but literally jumped over.”7 
In response to this major ICBM threat, beginning in 1959, the Ballistic Missile 
Early Warning System (BMEWS) was developed (see Figure 3). Consisting of huge 165 
feet high by 400 feet long radars, BMEWS became the first operational ballistic missile 
detection and warning system, designed to provide 15–25 minutes critical warning of a 




                                                 
7 Brief History of NORAD, 6. 
8 Tom Page,”BMEWS Site 1, Under Construction - 1958–1960,”Radomes, Inc., accessed 19 Feb 
2014,http://radomes.org/museum/documents/BMEWSSite1ThuleGL1958-60construction.html.  
Figure 3.  Thule BMEWS Site.8
 9
Later, because of growing concerns these BMEWS radars were unable to observe 
actual Soviet launches occurring far beyond the Earth’s horizon, the U.S. began 
developing its own missile technology to orbit successive generations of early warning 
satellites capable of immediately detecting any ICBM launch occurring around the globe. 
Space-based early warning progressed from the nascent “Missile Defense Alarm 
System” (MIDAS) system developed in the 1960s, to the more capable “Defense Support 
Program” (DSP) series of satellites employed during the 1970s to 1990s, to the current 
“Space-Based Infrared System” (SBIRS) series of satellites first launched in the 2000s.  







                                                 
9 Lockheed Martin Corp, “Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS),” accessed 19 Dec 2014, 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/sbirs.html. 
Figure 4.  SBIRS Space-Based Warning Satellite9
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Operating from geostationary orbit over 22,000 miles above the earth, these early 
warning satellite systems were designed to immediately detect any missile launches or 
nuclear explosions occurring across the globe using sensitive on-board sensors which 
could detect the infrared emissions from such intense heat sources.10 
Thus, an evolving Soviet threat caused NORAD to adapt its warning missions to 
include both aircraft and missile attacks on North America. Reflecting that evolution, the 
1981 NORAD Agreement officially changed the command’s name to the North 






                                                 
10 U.S. Air Force Factsheet, “Infrared Satellites,” accessed 19 Dec 2014, 
http://www.losangeles.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=20144.  
11 NORAD History Office. 
Figure 5.  New NORAD “Aerospace” Emblem of 1981.11
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3. Cruise Missile Warning 
While ICBMs remained the preferred weapons for attacking strategic land targets, 
beginning in the 1970s, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union began developing new sub-
sonic air-launched cruise missiles as a means of increasing the effectiveness of their 
strategic bomber force, while complicating the air defenses used by the enemy.12 
To meet this new threat, beginning in the 1980s, NORAD air defense plans began 
calling for the use of newly developed USAF Airborne Warning and Control System 
(AWACS) radar aircraft. Using airborne platforms allowed NORAD to greatly extend its 
ground-based radar surveillance coverage, thus enabling it to detect and warn against 
enemy cruise missiles approaching the coast of North America. (See Figure 6.) 
                                                 
12 Federation of American Scientists, “Cruise Missiles,” accessed on 3 Apr 2015, 
http://fas.org/nuke/intro/cm/index.html. 
13 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/images/Awacs3-onw.jpg. Accessed 21 Apr 
2015. 
Figure 6.  AWACS Airborne Early Warning (AEW) Aircraft13
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4. Cooperation with USNORTHCOM 
The attacks on 11 September 2001 made it clear assaults on the homeland could 
now arrive from within a nation’s borders. Thus, in October 2002, the U.S. Department 
of Defense (DOD) stood up its new U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), a joint 
military command specially tasked to execute the homeland defense mission.14 With 
NORAD executing the continental air defense mission, it seemed reasonable to co-locate 
the new USNORTHCOM headquarters with NORAD in Colorado Springs, and adopt a 












                                                 




Accessed 21 Apr 2015. 
Figure 7.  Headquarters NORAD and USNORTHCOM.16 
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C. NORAD’S NEW MARITIME WARNING MISSION 
As an aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Canada and the U.S. created a Binational 
Planning Group (BPG) in 2004 to work on multiple proposals for creating wider 
cooperation between Canadian and U.S. military plans and protocols, and to look for 
common mission areas in which the two countries could share information. One area of 
mutual interest was improving awareness of maritime threat routes which surround the 
North American continent.17 (See Figure 8.) 
                                                 
17 “2014: Piracy, Terrorism and Direct Maritime Threats,” The Maritime Executive, 14 Mar 2014, 
accessed 20 Apr 2015, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/2014-Piracy-Terrorism--Diverse-
Maritime-Threats-2014-03-14/. 
Figure 8.  Maritime Threat Routes.
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In a letter to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander NORAD 
supported the concept of NORAD being tasked with a new maritime surveillance, 
warning, and information sharing mission.18 
Thus, after lengthy staffing actions between headquarters, the U.S. and Canada 
signed a renewed NORAD Agreement, effective 12 May 2006, assigning NORAD with 
its new Maritime Warning mission, formally defined as:  
c. Maritime warning consists of processing, assessing, and disseminating 
intelligence and information related to the respective maritime areas and 
internal waterways of, and the maritime approaches to, the U.S. and 
Canada, and warning of maritime threats to, or attacks against North 
America utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands and 
agencies, to enable identification, validation, and response by national 
commands and agencies responsible for maritime defense and security.19 
D. THE FUTURE OF NORAD? 
In 2012, both the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the 
Canadian Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) jointly directed Commander NORAD to conduct 
a “NORAD Strategic Review” to address the following specific issues: 
 Review current and potential future roles, missions, and command 
relationships. 
 Inform and support analysis of need for investment in NORAD 
capabilities. 
 Recommend linkages to align respective national research and 
development, planning, programming and budgeting processes related to 
NORAD requirements. 
 Recommend ways to align readiness reporting processes.20 
 
                                                 
18 NORAD History Office, Letter from CDRNORAD to CJCS, dated 15 Jul 2004. 
19 NORAD History Office, NORAD Agreement, 28 Apr 2006. 
20 NORAD and USNORTHCOM, NORAD Strategic Review, 3 Dec 2014.  (Note: Only unclassified 
paragraphs were quoted.) 
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When asked about the pending NORAD Strategic Review, General Charles 
Jacoby (then-Commander NORAD) replied: 
We are deliberately moving out on a review that looks at the threat 
assessment, readiness assessment and program assessment processes that 
we need to put in place or revitalize, as the case may be, to ensure that 
we’re staying ahead of the threat. The threat to North America is changing 
and increasing as time goes by, and that includes cyber threats, threats to 
space, changing in the extremist threat to North America, changing in 
some of the more conventional threats and making sure that NORAD is 
positioned to keep faith with the agreement. (Emphasis added)21 
Completed in November 2014, the Review “identified the emergence of new 
threats and capabilities which have the potential to affect NORAD”s ability to deter, 
detect, and defeat threats to Canada and the U.S. The recommendations presented address 
current and emerging threats, ensuring our ability to monitor, control, and if necessary 
respond.”22 Specifically addressing cyberspace, the NORAD Strategic Review stated: 
NORAD must be aware of current and emerging cyberspace threats and 
the means by which NORAD’s systems will be protected in order to meet 
their mission requirements. Therefore, NORAD must develop agreements 
and processes with trusted organizations and agencies to better analyze, 
characterize, assess, and share the impact of cyberspace events on 
NORAD operations, and the steps taken to defend NORAD networks 
against cyberspace-attacks.23 
Improvement of information sharing processes with cyberspace 
organizations and examination of new relationships can fill operational 
gaps to enhance NORAD mission assurance. (Canada’s Department of 
National Defence) and (U.S.’ Department of Defense) should examine 
NORAD’s potential roles and responsibilities in providing binational 
Cyberspace Warning for North America. (Emphasis added.)24  
                                                 
21 Marcus Weisgerber, “Interview: General Charles Jacoby,” Defense News, 19 Jul 2014, 
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140719/DEFREG02/307190018/Interview-Gen-Charles-Jacoby. 
22  NORAD Strategic Review (Final Report), 18 Nov 2014, cover memorandum. 
23 Ibid., 22. 
24 Ibid., 23. 
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E. CYBER WARFARE COMPONENTS 
1. Current Cyberspace Threat Actors 
In his testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on January 29, 
2014, James Clapper (Director of National Intelligence) provided an overview of the 
various international cyber threat actors currently challenging the U.S.: 
We assess that computer network exploitation and disruption activities 
such as denial-of-service attacks will continue. Further, we assess that the 
likelihood of a destructive attack that deletes information or renders 
systems inoperable will increase as malware and attack tradecraft 
proliferate.25 
First, Director Clapper highlighted his growing concerns regarding the evolving 
Russian cyber threat: 
Russia presents a range of challenges to U.S. cyber policy and network 
security. Russia seeks changes to the international system for Internet 
governance that would compromise U.S. interests and values. Its Ministry 
of Defense (MOD) is establishing its own cyber command, according to 
senior MOD officials, which will seek to perform many of the functions 
similar to those of the U.S. Cyber Command.26 
As an example, the FireEye network security company stated they had reason to 
believe an “advanced persistent threat” (APT) from Russia had been operating since at 
least 2007, and was engaged in espionage against political and military targets. The 
report outlined how it was believed Russian hackers had targeted the Georgian Ministry 
of Defense; interfered with the Bulgarian, Polish and Hungarian governments; targeted 
Baltic military forces supporting U.S. Army training; and targeted several North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) organizations.27 
                                                 
25 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community, 24 Jan 2014,” accessed on 20 Apr 2015, 
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/140129/clapper.pdf. 
26 “Russia Preparing New Cyber Warfare Branch, Military Officials Say,” Softpedia, accessed 17 Dec 
2014, http://news.softpedia.com/news/Russia-Preparing-New-Cyber-Warfare-Branch-Military-Official-
Says-376807.shtml. 
27 Pierluigi Paganini, “APT28: Fireeye Uncovered a Russian Cyber Espionage Campaign,” Security 
Affairs, 29 Oct 2014, accessed 17 Dec 2014, http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/29683/intelligence/apt28-
fireeye-russian-espionage.html.  
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Director Clapper then identified to the Select Committee how China was also 
becoming a serious cyberspace threat to the Nation: 
China’s cyber operations reflect its leadership’s priorities of economic 
growth, domestic political stability, and military preparedness… 
Internationally, China also seeks to revise the multi-stakeholder model of 
Internet governance while continuing its expansive worldwide program of 
network exploitation and intellectual property theft.28 
Underscoring this threat, in May of 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted 
five members of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), charging these individuals 
with hacking into computer networks owned by the U.S. Steel Corporation, 
Westinghouse Electric, and other major corporations. The Justice Department indictment 
specifically focused on “Unit 61398,” acknowledged as being the Shanghai-based cyber 
unit of the PLA. While acknowledging countries conduct espionage for national security 
purposes, the indictment charged it was illegal for China to employ national intelligence 
assets to steal U.S. corporate secrets in order to gain an economic advantage.29 
Director Clapper also warned the Committee about two other serious cyber threat 
actors.  “Iran and North Korea are unpredictable actors in the international arena. Their 
development of cyber espionage or attack capabilities might be used in an attempt to 
either provoke or destabilize the U.S. or its partners.”30 
Regarding Iran, U.S. Representative Peter Hoekstra (R-Michigan) stated, “Iran 
has boosted its cyber capabilities in a surprisingly short amount of time and possesses the 
ability to launch successful cyber attacks on American financial markets and its 
infrastructure.”31  
                                                 
28 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community, 24 Jan 2014.” 
29 Michael Schmidt and David Sanger, “5 in China Army Face U.S. Charges of Cyberattacks,”       
New York Times, 19 May 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-charge-chinese-workers-
with-cyberspying.html?_r=0. 
30 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community, 24 Jan 2014.” 
31 U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Joint Subcommittee Hearing, “Iran’s Support for 
Terrorism Worldwide,” 4 Mar 2014, accessed on 4 Apr 2015, 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20140304/101832/HHRG-113-FA13-20140304-SD001.pdf. 
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Finally, North Korea has expended enormous resources to develop its cyber 
warfare cell called “Bureau 121” under the General Bureau of Reconnaissance, a spy 
agency run by the North Korean military.32 South Korean intelligence contends Bureau 
121 has repeatedly conducted cyber attacks against numerous South Korea businesses, to 
include incidents in 2010 and 2012 targeting banks and media organizations. Pyongyang 
rejects these charges.33 
Thus, we clearly see the Intelligence Community’s rising concern about the 
cyberspace threat posed by several potentially hostile nations, and the general consensus 
that these global threats are indeed serious and not abating. 
2. Typical Cyber Weapons 
In their article “Cyber-Weapons,” Thomas Rid and Peter McBurney state there is 
no internationally agreed-upon definition of a cyber weapon. Therefore, they proposed 
the following definition: “A cyber weapon is seen as a subset of weapons, more generally 
as computer code that is used, or designed to be used, with the aim of threatening or 
causing physical, functional, or mental harm to structures, systems, or living beings.” 
(Emphasis added.)34 
Expanding upon this proposed definition, in his book Cyberattack, Paul Day 
proposed four levels of cyber weapons:35 
 Level 1. “Dual use” software tools provided with a computer’s organic 
operating system, such as network monitoring tools, which can be converted into hacking 
tools and exploit security vulnerabilities. 
 
                                                 
32 Ju-Min Park and James Pearson, “In North Korea, Hackers Are a Handpicked, Pampered Elite,” 
Reuters, 5 Dec 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/05/us-sony-cybersecurity-northkorea-
idUSKCN0JJ08B20141205.  
33 Kyung Lah and Greg Botelho, “Watch Out World: North Korea Deep Into Cyber Warfare, Defector 
Says,”Cable News Network, 18 Dec 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/18/world/asia/north-korea-hacker-
network/index.html.  
34 Thomas Rid and Peter McBurney”Cyber-Weapons,” The Rusi Journal, Feb/Mar 2012, 6–13, 
accessed 21 Apr 2015, https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201202_Rid_and_McBurney.pdf. 
35 Paul Day, Cyberattack (London, UK: Carlton Publishing Group, 2013), 120–122. 
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 Level 2. Software tools that can be downloaded for computer security 
purposes that are then abused to compromise networks and computers. This software is 
specifically designed to allow skilled operators to test and penetrate system security, but 
in the wrong hands can subvert a network.  
 Level 3. Malware designed only to exploit and infect other computers. 
Examples include RAT, spyware, and botnet clients. Again, these programs are widely 
available on the Internet. 
 Level 4. Purposely built cyber weapons covertly developed by nation 
states with the expressed intention of waging cyber warfare. The most famous example is 
the “Stuxnet” worm discovered in 2010. (This level would match cyber weapon attacks 
as outlined by Rid and McBurney.) 
3. Concept of “Cyber Attack” 
In order to discuss the merits of any proposed cyber attack warning policy, it 
would be helpful to have a clear definition of what specifically defines a “cyber attack.” 
Media Definitions. While the news media repeatedly warns us about “cyber 
attacks,”36 there currently are no uniformly agreed-upon terms to describe cybersecurity 
activities. Typical cyber actions are often publically described as:37 
 “Cyber-vandalism” or “hacktivism” (defacing or otherwise temporarily 
interfering with public access websites.) 
 “Cyber-crime” or “cyber-theft” (defrauding individuals to obtain their 
personal identification data, or actual theft of funds from financial accounts.) 
 “Cyber-espionage” (covertly stealing sensitive or proprietary information.) 
 “Cyber-warfare” (conducting military operations using cyber means.) 
                                                 
36 “Cyber Attacks on South Korean Nuclear Power Operator Continue,” The Guardian, 28 Dec 2014, 
accessed 21 Apr 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/28/cyber attacks-south-korean-
nuclear-power-operator. 
37 “At the Nexus of Cybersecurity and Public Policy: Some Basic Concepts and Issues,” National 
Academy of Science, 2014, vii, accessed 17 Dec 2014, 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=18749.   
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Popular cyber terms used in the media include “breach,” “compromise,” 
“intrusion,” “exploit,” “hack,” “incident,” and “attack.”38 So what is the difference 
between these various terms? Specifically, from a military viewpoint, what should be 
meant by a “cyber attack”? 
NATO Definition. We begin by defining an “act of aggression” as being “the use 
of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Chart of the 
United Nations.”39 Examples of acts of aggression outlined by the United Nations in its 
resolution include: 
 The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State into the territory of 
another State. 
 Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of 
another State, or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another state. 
 The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State. 
 An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or 
marine and air fleets of another State.40 
Given this general definition of an act of aggression, what does it mean to conduct 
a “cyber attack?”  
To answer this issue, beginning in 2009, NATO undertook a three-year project to 
identify the international laws applicable to cyber warfare, with a goal of defining 
specific rules governing such conflicts. 
Working with twenty international law scholars and cyber practitioners, this 
working group eventually published their Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare in 2013. 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 30. 
39 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), “Definition of Aggression,” Article 1 
(Dec 14, 1974), accessed 18 May 2014, http://www.un-documents.net/a29r3314.htm.  
40 Ibid., Article 3. 
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First, the Tallinn group developed a general definition of the “use of force” for 
cyber operations: “A cyber operation constitutes a use of force when its scale and effects 
are comparable to non-cyber operations rising to the level of a use of force.”41 
The group found focusing on the “scale and effects” of a cyber operation was a 
useful approach when attempting to distinguish between cyber acts which unmistakably 
qualify as use of force (e.g., such as acts that injure people or damage property) from 
cyber acts which do not cause physical harm. Used this way, “scale and effects” 
effectively captures the qualitative factors to be considered in evaluating whether a cyber 
operation reached the level of other kinetic actions analogous to a use of force.42 
The group next developed a set of eight specific factors to consider in judging 
whether a specific cyber operation actually constituted the “use of force.” As stated in the 
Tallinn Manual, these include: 
 Severity. Consequences involving physical harm to individuals or property 
will in and of themselves qualify the act as a use of force…the scope, duration, and 
intensity of the event will have great bearing on the appraisal of their severity. 
 Immediacy. The sooner consequences manifest, the less opportunity States 
have to seek peaceful accommodation of a dispute or to otherwise forestall their harmful 
effects. 
 Directness. Cyber operations in which the cause and effect are clearly 
linked are more likely to be characterized as uses of force. 
 Invasiveness. As a rule, the more secure a targeted cyber system, the 
greater the concern as to its penetration. For example, cyber operations targeting State 
domain names (e.g., “.mil” or “.gov”) could be considered more invasive than cyber 
operations directed at non-State domain names (e.g., “.com” or “.net.”)  
                                                 
41 Michael N. Schmitt, edit., Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, 
(Cambridge, UK: University Press, 2013.)  (Note: Tallinn is the capital of Estonia, where the first modern 
cyber attack occurred, where the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence is now located, 
and where this manual was eventually developed.) 
42 Ibid., 48. 
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 Measurability of Effects. The more quantifiable and identifiable a set of 
consequences, the easier it will be for a State to assess the situation when determining 
whether the cyber operation in question has reached the level of a use of force.  
 Military Character. The closer the connection between the cyber operation 
and military operations, the more likely it will be deemed a use of force. 
 State Involvement. The clearer and closer a nexus between a State and 
cyber operations, the more likely it is that other States will characterize them as uses of 
force by that State. 
 Presumptive Legality. Finally, the group clarified that acts not forbidden 
by international law are permitted and are presumptively legal. Thus, propaganda, 
psychological operations, espionage, economic pressure, etc., are all actions allowed by 
international law. Thus, cyber operations falling into these internationally legal categories 
will be less likely to be considered by States as uses of force.43 
Using these specific factors, the Tallinn group then developed a definition of the 
“threat of force” under cyber operations: “A cyber operation, or threatened cyber 
operation, constitutes an unlawful threat of force when the threatened action, if carried 
out, would be an unlawful use of force.”44 
Finally, linking all previous definitions into a coherent concept, the Tallinn group 
developed a definitive definition of what constitutes a genuine “cyber attack”:  
A cyber attack is a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is 
reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or 
destruction to objects.45 
Thus, after considerable legal deliberations and debate, the Tallinn group 
developed a definition of “cyber attack” useful in policy development, military strategies, 
and international affairs. It excludes non-lethal activities (such as cyber-crime and cyber-
espionage) and allows for both state and non-state actors.  
                                                 
43 Ibid., 48–51. 
44 Ibid., 52. 
45 Ibid., 106. 
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More importantly, the NATO definition clearly provides a logical connection 
between the legal concepts of “an act of aggression,” “use of force,” “threat of force,” 
“armed attack,” and “self-defense.” And it provides useful factors for consideration in 
determining whether the “scale and effects” of a specific cyber operation constitutes an 
actual armed attack upon a State. 
Expressing similar concerns about growing worldwide cyberspace threats, NATO 
endorsed a new “Enhance Cyber Defence Policy” during its 2014 North Atlantic Council 
Summit. In its published Declaration, NATO stated: 
The policy reaffirms the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security 
and of prevention, detection, resilience, recovery, and defence. It recalls 
that the fundamental cyber defence responsibility of NATO is to defend its 
own networks, and that assistance to Allies should be addressed in 
accordance with the spirit of solidarity, emphasizing the responsibility of 
Allies to develop the relevant capabilities for the protection of national 
networks…Close bilateral and multinational cooperation plays a key role 
in enhancing the cyber defence capabilities of the Alliance.46 
Former NATO Commander Definition. Interestingly, in January 2015, Admiral 
James Stavridis (NATO Commander from 2009–2013) disagreed with this specific 
NATO definition. He stated the Tallinn Manual definition of cyber attack was “far too 
simplistic to account for the nuances of cyberwarfare. It sets a dangerously high threshold 
for a domain with comparatively low barriers to entry.”47 
Stavridis proposed there are three elements to “cyberforce”: Intelligence 
(understanding the target environment), cyberweapons (the actual computer code, usually 
target-specific with a short shelf life), and intent (a calculated human decision). He then 
proposes it is specifically the cyberweapon which defines whether cyberforce approaches 
the level of a genuine armed attack.48 
 
                                                 
46 NATO Wales Summit Declaration, 5 Sep 2014, paras 72–73, accessed 17 Dec 2014, 
http://www.cfr.org/nato/wales-summit-declaration/p33394. 




For example, Stavridis outlines the 2012 “Shamoon” virus that infected Saudi 
Aramco, the world’s largest State-owned oil company. This cyber operation erased data 
from computer memories which the company could not reconstitute. Also, company 
systems were down for two weeks, resulting in adverse global economic affects. Finally, 
more than 30,000 workstations were replaced to rid the corporation network of malware. 
This action “is a far better measure of cyberforce than simply concentrated personal 
injury or physical damage. Yet, according to the Tallinn Manual, Shamoon was not a 
cyber attack.”49 
Therefore, Stavridis offers his own alternative definition: 
A cyber attack is the deliberate projection of cyberforce resulting in 
kinetic or nonkinetic consequences that threaten or otherwise destabilize 
national security, harm economic interests, create political or cultural 
instability; or hurt individuals, devices or systems.50 
This may become a more useful definition for future military planners, as it 
broadens threats from cyberspace operations to include those actions which inflict 
economic harm or national security instability. 
4. Military Cyberspace Definitions 
Finally, from a Department of Defense (DOD) perspective, military cyberspace 
missions can be characterized using the following unclassified definitions: 
Department of Defense Information Networks (DODIN). “The globally 
interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, and associated processes for 
collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on-demand to 
warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel, including owned and leased 
communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), 
data, security services, other associated services, and national security systems.”51 
 
                                                 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3–38, “Cyber Electromagnetic Activities,” 3–7 Feb 2014, 
accessed 21 Apr 2015, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_38.pdf. 
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DODIN Operations. “Operations to design, build, configure, secure, operate, 
maintain, and sustain Department of Defense networks to create and preserve information 
assurance on the Department of Defense information networks.”52 DODIN operations are 
the traditional methods we all think of to preserve data availability, integrity, 
confidentiality, and user authentication. These operations include configuration control 
and system patches, user training, physical security, firewalls, and data encryption. Many 
DODIN activities are conducted through regularly scheduled events and updates. 
Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO). These are operations which respond to 
unauthorized activity or alert/threat information against the DODIN. DCO can be both 
“passive and active cyberspace operations intended to preserve the ability to utilize 
friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect data, networks, net-centric capabilities, and 
other designated systems.”53  DCO consists of both internal defensive measures and DCO 
Response Actions (DCO-RA):  
“Internal defense measures” are conducted within the DODIN. These are defined 
as being “defensive tools and techniques [which] are designed to find, fix and finish 
anomalous network activity using rule, signature and behavioral-based techniques.”54 
 “DCO-RA” are defensive measures taken outside the defended network to 
protect DOD cyberspace capabilities. Once sources of a cyber attack are identified, 
response actions (such as custom-made computer code) may be implemented to defend 
friendly cyberspace systems.55 
Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO). These are “operations intended to 
project power by the application of force in and through cyberspace.”56 OCO focuses 
effects in cyberspace to influence or degrade enemy weapon systems, command and 
control processes, critical infrastructures, etc. 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 3–7. 
53 Ibid., 3–6. 
54 Ibid., 3–6. 
55 Ibid., 3–6. 
56 Ibid., 3–2. 
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Cyberspace Attack. Cyberspace activities that create denial effects (by degrading, 
disrupting or destroying access to, operation of, or availability of a target) or that 
manipulate (by controlling or changing an adversary’s information or networks.)57 






                                                 
57 Ibid., 3–3. 
58 Ibid., 3–2.  
Figure 9.  DOD Cyberspace Operations.58 
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As can be seen, the topic of “cyber attack” involves not only various potential 
definitions of what a cyber attack actually entails, but also what means are available to 
either defensively or offensively respond to such an attack. While these definitions 
remain fluid, they provide an essential conceptual foundation to allow policy makers to 
consider how “cyber attack warning” might specifically be implemented by NORAD. 
F. KEY U.S. MILITARY CYBER ORGANIZATIONS 
1. Department of Defense 
The Department of Defense (DOD) is the executive department of the U.S. 
charged with coordinating all agencies and functions concerned directly with the U.S. 
Armed Forces. (See Figures 10 and 11.) 
Headed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), DOD has three subordinate 
military departments: the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.   
DOD’s theater military operations are managed by nine Combatant Commands. (Note: 
NORAD is not part of DOD, as it is a separate, binational command reporting to both the 
U.S. and Canada.) 
2. Joint Chief of Staff 
Within the civilian DOD falls the military Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which 
consists of the Chairman JCS (CJCS); the Vice Chairman; the Chiefs of Staff of the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Chief of the 
National Guard Bureau, and the administrative Joint Staff (JS). (See Figure 11.) 
The CJCS serves as the primary military adviser to the president, to the SecDef, 
and to the National Security Council. The JCS have no executive authority to command 
combat forces, which are assigned directly to Combatant Commands.59 
 
                                                 







                                                 
60 U.S. Department of Defense, “Organization of the Department of Defense,” accessed 30 Dec 2014, 
http://odam.defense.gov/OMP/Functions/OrganizationalPortfolios/OrganizationandFunctionsGuidebook.as
px. 
Figure 10.  DOD Organizational Chart.60
Figure 11.  DOD and JCS Emblems.
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3. U.S. Northern Command 
Created in 2002, USNORTHCOM is the Combatant Command charged with 
conducting homeland defense, civil support and security cooperation to defend and 
secure the U.S. and its interests within the North America. (See Figure 12.) 
“USNORTHCOM’s area of responsibility includes air, land and sea approaches 
and encompasses the continental U.S., Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding 
water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, the 
Straits of Florida, and portions of the Caribbean region to include The Bahamas, Puerto 
Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The commander of USNORTHCOM is responsible for 
theater security cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas.”61  
“USNORTHCOM consolidates under a single unified command existing missions 
that were previously executed by other DOD organizations. This consolidation provides 
better unity of command, which is critical to mission accomplishment.”62 






                                                 
61 U.S. Northern Command, “About USNORTHCOM,” accessed 30 Dec 2014,  
http://www.northcom.mil/AboutUSNORTHCOM.aspx 
62 Ibid. 
Figure 12.  USNORTHCOM Emblem.
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4. U.S. Strategic Command 
“USSTRATCOM combines the synergy of the U.S. legacy nuclear command and 
control mission with responsibility for space operations; global strike; global missile 
defense; and global command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); and combating weapons of mass 
destruction.”63 (See Figure 13.) 
Per its mission statement, “USSTRATCOM conducts global operations in 
coordination with other Combatant Commands, Services, and appropriate U.S. 
Government agencies to deter and detect strategic attacks against the U.S. and its allies, 
and is prepared to defend the nation as directed.”64  
To execute its specific military cyberspace responsibilities, USSTRATCOM 
commands the subordinate U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).65 





                                                 
63 U.S. Strategic Command, “Mission and Priorities,” accessed 12 Feb 2014, 
https://www.stratcom.mil/about/. 
64  U.S. Strategic Command, “Mission and Priorities,” accessed 12 Feb 2014, 
https://www.stratcom.mil/mission/. 
65 U.S. Strategic Command, “Mission and Priorities,” accessed 12 Feb 2014, 
https://www.stratcom.mil/functional_components/. 
Figure 13.  USSTRATCOM Emblem.
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5. U.S. Cyber Command 
Created in 2009, USCYBERCOM “unifies the direction of cyberspace operations, 
strengthens DOD cyberspace capabilities, and integrates and bolsters DOD’s cyber 
expertise.”  (See Figure 14.) 
“USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes and conducts 
activities to:  
– Direct the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense 
information networks and; 
– Prepare to, and when directed, conduct full spectrum military cyberspace 
operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of action 
in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries.”  
USCYBERCOM is located in Fort Meade, Maryland, and is co-located with the 









Figure 14.  USCYBERCOM Emblem.
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G. KEY CANADIAN MILITARY CYBER ORGANIZATIONS 
1. Department of National Defence 
The Department of the National Defence (DND) is the executive department of 
the Canadian government charged with coordinating all agencies and functions concerned 
directly with national security and the Canadian Armed Forces.  (See Figures 15 and 16.) 
Headed by the Minister of National Defence (MND), DND has three subordinate 
military departments: the Canadian Army, the Royal Canadian Navy, and the Royal 
Canadian Air Force.  (Note: Again, NORAD is also not part of DND, as it is a separate, 
binational command reporting to both the U.S. and Canada.) 
 
 
                                                 
66 Canadian Department of National Defence, “Organizational Structure,” accessed 2 Jan 2015, 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-org-structure/index.page.  







2. Strategic Joint Staff 
Within the civilian DND falls the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), the 
Commanders of the Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy, and Royal Canadian Air 
Force; and the administrative Strategic Joint Staff (SJS). (See Figure 16.) 
The CDS serves as the principal military adviser to the prime minister, the MND, 
and the Government of Canada.67 The SJS have no executive authority to command 






                                                 
67  Canadian Department of National Defence, “Chief of the Defence Staff,” accessed 2 Jan 2015, 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-org-structure/chief-of-defence-staff.page. 
Figure 16.  DND and SJS Crests.
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3. Canadian Joint Operations Command 
Established in 2012 in Ottawa, Ontario, “CJOC is responsible for conducting full-
spectrum Canadian Armed Forces operations at home, on the continent of North 





Integrating the operations of three previously separate military commands, “CJOC 
directs Canadian military operations from their earliest planning stages through to 
mission closeout, and ensures that national strategic goals are achieved.”69 
CJOC coordinates all military operations via its Canadian Forces Integrated 
Command Centre (CFICC). The only military operations CJOC does not command are 
those missions carried out by: 
 Canadian Special Operations Forces Command. 
 North American Aerospace Defense Command.70  
 
 
                                                 




Figure 17.  CJOC Crest.
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4. Canadian Forces Information Operations Group 
Falling under the DND Assistant Deputy Minister for Information Management, 
the Director General of Information Management Operations (DGIMO) is responsible for 
overseeing CFIOG, which is charged with conducting Electronic Warfare (EW), Signals 
Intelligence (SIGINT), and Network Defense in support of Canadian Forces operations. 
(See Figure 18.) (Note: DGIMO is dual-hatted as the CJOC Cyber Component 
Commander.) 
CFIOG operates the Canadian Forces Electronic Warfare Centre (CFEWC), the 
Canadian Forces Network Operation Centre (CFNOC), and Canadian Forces Station 
(CFS) Leitrim itself, Canada’s oldest signal intelligence station.71 
Overall, DGIMO and CFIOG together can be considered equivalent to U.S. Cyber 
Command, while CFNOC corresponds to more tactical, military service-operated cyber 
organization such as the U.S. Army Cyber Command, the U.S. Fleet Cyber Command or 




                                                 
71 Jerry Proc, “Radio Communications and Signals Intelligence in the Royal Canadian Navy, CFS 
Leitrim” accessed 21 Apr 2015, http://jproc.ca/rrp/leitrim.html. 
Figure 18.  DGIMO, CFIOG and CFNOC Crests. 
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H. MILITARY CYBER EVENT CONFERENCES 
1. Cyber Event Conferences 
The CJCS has established emergency conferencing procedures to allow military 
commands around the world to simultaneously connect and discuss urgent military 
events. One type of cyberspace event consultation was previously entitled “Operation 
Gladiator Phoenix” conferences:72 
(U) Operation GLADIATOR PHOENIX Conference (OGPC).The OGPC 
allows USCYBERCOM to rapidly investigate any significant cyber 
activities and determine if there is a possible cyber attack on the U.S., its 
national security, civilian or military personnel, critical infrastructure, and/
or other national assets or interests.73 
Managed by USCYBERCOM, these classified, encrypted conferences are used by 
cyberspace technical experts to discuss real-time network concerns. Recently, OGP 
conferences were split into two new discussion groups and renamed: 
 “Cyber Watch Conferences” now provide a specialized forum for 
operational watch centers to identify and troubleshoot anomalous cyberspace indications, 
conduct checks to verify circuits are serviceable, communication encryption devices are 
functioning, satellite relay systems are operative, etc. 
  “Cyber Event Conferences” now allow senior decision-makers to discuss 
potential operational impacts with each other, and to deliberate what follow-on 
cyberspace actions might be required. 
Typically, whenever USCYBERCOM detects a cyberspace event, it notifies all 
applicable command centers (such as Headquarters NORAD and USNORTHCOM) using 
either a “Cyber Watch Conference” or “Cyber Event Conference” (depending on the 
severity of the cyber event) to resolve any resulting issues. (See Figure 19.) 
                                                 
72 U.S. Department of Defense, “Emergency Action Procedures of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Volume VI, Emergency Conferences (U),” 14 Sep 2012.  (Note: Information presented are from 
unclassified paragraphs.) 
73 Ibid., II-15. 
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2. National Event Conference 
Another, more senior conference (managed by the Pentagon) is entitled the 
“National Event Conference” or NEC, in which agencies are brought together for 
situational awareness regarding a significant national event. 
One significant situation that can trigger a NEC is a “cyberspace event,” defined 
as “…any significant loss or serious threat of loss of networks or data (e.g., critical 
cyberspace links or nodes, cyberspace mission data providing assets) that threaten U.S. 
national security or interests.”74 
During a cyber NEC, Commander USCYBERCOM is required to make an 
official “Cyberspace Attack Assessment” to U.S. (but not currently Canadian) national 






                                                 
74 Ibid., II-14. 
75 Ibid., II-14. 





In the judgment of CDRUSCYBERCOM, a verified Cyberspace Attack 
has occurred, is occurring or is imminent. 
CONCERN 
In the judgment of CDRUSCYBERCOM, a Cyberspace Attack may be 
in progress or is imminent. The situation is still under assessment and 
may warrant implementation of appropriate measures and/or plans to 
enhance cyberspace responsiveness and inter-agency awareness. 
NO 
In the judgment of CDRUSCYBERCOM, a verified Cyberspace Attack 
has not occurred, nor is one in progress. 
PENDING 
The judgment of CDRUSCYBERCOM will be provided as soon as 
possible. No assessment is available at this time. There is inadequate 
information available to assess whether a Cyberspace Attack is or may 








                                                 
76 Ibid., II-14. 
Table 1.   Cyberspace Attack Assessment Criteria.76 
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Finally, the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center (N2C2) acts as the 
central point of contact and coordinator for participation in all national conferences for 




This joint command center integrates missile warning, air warning, maritime 
warning, land operations, and cyberspace operations, bringing the Commands’ multiple 
missions together to create greater synergy.   
However, due to U.S. information classification restrictions, Canadian personnel 
must exit any national event conference once specific “US-only” classified topics are 
being discussed.  
 
                                                 
77 Lockheed Martin, “Integrated Space Command & Control (ISC2),” accessed 13 Jan 2015, 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/isc2.html. 
Figure 20.  NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center.77 
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I. SUMMARY 
Since 1958, NORAD has a proven history of adapting and evolving to meet 
changing military defense challenges using new technology—from its early years 
providing ground-based radar warning of approaching Soviet bombers, to ground-based 
radar warning of in-bound Soviet ICBMS, to satellite-based warning of any missile 
launch occurring around the world, to extended radar warning of approaching cruise 
missiles, to the warning of suspect maritime vessels approaching North America. 
NORAD has sole responsibility for receiving early warnings from numerous 
space-based and ground-based sensors and developing an integrated North American 
attack assessment. And because all of the sensors feeding into NORAD travel across the 
broader “information superhighway,” there exists a genuine risk of potentially hostile 
nations conducting damaging cyberspace operations against NORAD (to include blinding 
NORAD to actual threats or feeding the Command false information for incorrect action.) 
With the recent increase in world-wide cyberspace events, NORAD has thus begun 
examining its own potential role in this new operational domain. 
As we have seen, an exact definition defining the meaning of “cyber attack” 
remains in flux. Despite this lack of definition, both the U.S. and Canada have been quick 
to establish new, dedicated military organizations specializing in cyberspace operations. 
Further, military cyberspace event conferences now share warning information between 
U.S. Combatant Commands around the world, to include the NORAD-USNORTHCOM 
Command Center. (One area of concern: current U.S. policies restrict the sharing of 
certain classified information with Canadian NORAD members.) 
Given this historical, terminology, organizational and event conference 
background, we can now review the principle U.S. and Canadian strategic documents 





III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Cyberspace warning is influenced by a host of international, governmental and 
military policies and guidance. Both the U.S. and Canada governments have published 
many documents providing guidance to military commands at the strategic, operational, 
and tactical levels. A brief survey of key directives helps clarify the roles and authorities 
of each level of government in dealing with potential cyberspace attacks. 
B.  NORAD GUIDANCE 
1. NORAD Agreement 
On May 12, 1958, the “NORAD Agreement” statutorily establishing the “North 
American Air Defense Command” (NORAD) was formalized between the U.S. and 
Canadian governments. The Agreement has then reviewed, revised, and renewed 
approximately every five years (most recently, on 28 April 2006.)78 
During the March 1996 renewal, NORAD’s missions were redefined to be 
“aerospace warning” and “aerospace control” for North America.79  
Then, during the May 2006 renewal, the new “maritime warning” mission was 
added to the command’s existing aerospace warning and control missions. In this 
renewal, the two nations outlined their mutual understanding of the current political, 
military and threat environment in the Agreement’s preamble: 
MINDFUL that in the years since the first NORAD Agreement was 
concluded on May 12, 1958, NORAD, as a distinct command, has evolved 
to address the continuing changes in the nature of the threats to North 
America and that it will need to continue to adapt to future shared 
security interests (emphasis added); 
 
                                                 




AWARE of dramatic changes in the geostrategic environment and in the 
threats to North America, as illustrated by the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, in terms of the nations, non-state actors or terrorist 
groups that might choose to challenge North American security, the 
symmetry and asymmetry of the weapons and methods they could employ, 
and the transnational and global nature of these threats; 
ACKNOWLEDGING that space has become an important dimension of 
national interest and has become an increasingly significant component of 
most traditional military activities, and that a growing number of nations 
have acquired or have ready access to space services that could be used for 
strategic and tactical purposes against the interests of the U.S. and Canada; 
REALIZING that a shared understanding and awareness of the activities 
conducted in their respective maritime approaches, maritime areas and 
inland waterways, including the capacity to identify vessels of potential 
interest, are critical to their ability to monitor, control, and respond to 
threats so that their shared security is ensured; 
DESIRING to ensure that their respective and mutual defense 
requirements are met in the current and projected geostrategic 
circumstances; HAVE AGREED as follows…80 
Four Articles of the Agreement then outline the specific areas of mutual 
agreement. Under Article I, “NORAD Missions,” specific definitions were provided 
outlining the binational Command’s now-three core missions: 
Aerospace warning consists of processing, assessing and disseminating 
intelligence and information related to man-made objects in the aerospace 
domain and the detection, validation, and warning of attack against North 
America whether by aircraft, missiles or space vehicles, utilizing mutual 
support arrangements with other commands and agencies. 
Aerospace control consists of providing surveillance and operational 
control of the airspace of the United States and Canada. “Operational 
control” is the authority to direct, coordinate and control the operational 




                                                 
80 U.S. Department of State, “NORAD Agreement,” 28 Apr 2006, accessed 21 Apr 2015, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/69727.pdf. 
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Maritime warning consists of processing, assessing and disseminating 
intelligence and information related to the respective maritime areas and 
internal waterways of, and the maritime approaches to, the U.S. and 
Canada, and warning of maritime threats to, or attacks against North 
America utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands and 
agencies, to enable identification, validation, and response by national 
commands and agencies responsible for maritime defence and security.81 
Thus, over the course of 50 years, NORAD has repeatedly reassessed, redefined, 
and updated its core operational missions based upon a constantly evolving threat. The 
NORAD Agreement clearly reflects the desire for NORAD to be able to adapt and defend 
against newly evolving military threats which each nation may jointly face. 
2. NORAD Strategic Review 
Completed by the NORAD headquarters staff in December 2014, the NORAD 
Strategic Review stated, “NORAD must be aware of current and emerging cyber threats 
and the means by with NORAD’s systems will be protected in order to meet their mission 
requirements. Therefore, NORAD must develop agreements and processes with mission 
partners to better analyze, characterize, assess, and share the impact of cyber events on 
NORAD operations, and defend NORAD networks against cyber attacks. Currently, there 
is no formal U.S.-Canada process to collectively analyze, characterize and assess the 
operational impact of North American cyberspace events and the provide timely, 
simultaneous warning of attack/threat to the national leaderships of Canada and the 
U.S..” (Emphasis added.)82  
“Improvement of information sharing processes with cyber mission partners and 
examination of new relationships can fill operational gaps to enhance NORAD mission 
assurance. DND and DOD should examine NORAD’s potential roles and responsibilities 
in providing binational Cyberspace Warning for North America.” (Emphasis added.)83  
                                                 
81 Ibid. 
82 North American Aerospace Defense Command, “NORAD Strategic Review (S//RELCAN),” 3 Dec 
2014, 22.  (Only unclassified paragraphs were quoted.) 
83 Ibid., 23. 
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C. U.S. NATIONAL CYBERSPACE GUIDANCE 
1. Executive Branch 
a. National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (2003) 
Recognizing the need to protect federal computers now connected via the “new” 
Internet, this Strategy directed the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) become 
the “federal center of excellence for cyber-security.” The Strategy articulated five 
national priorities: 
 I - A National Cyberspace Security Response System; 
 II - A National Cyberspace Security Threat and Vulnerability Reduction 
Program; 
 III - A National Cyberspace Security Awareness and Training Program; 
 IV - Securing Governments’ Cyberspace; and 
 V - National Security and International Cyberspace Security Cooperation. 
(Emphasis added.)84  
Thus, a key feature of the National Cyber Strategy was the recommendation to 
work with international partners to develop international watch-and-warning networks in 
order to detect and prevent cyber attacks (a relevant information-sharing theme that will 
be repeated in numerous national guidance documents to follow.) 
b. Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (2008) 
A classified document, the CNCI outlined twelve reinforcing initiatives designed 
to help secure the Nation in cyberspace.85 Initiative #10 is of particular interest: 
 
                                                 
84 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,” Feb 2003, 
accessed 10 Feb 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/national-strategy-secure-cyberspace. 
85  The White House, “Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative,” Jan 2008, accessed 10 Feb 
2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cybersecurity/national-initiative. 
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Initiative #10. Define and develop enduring deterrence strategies and 
programs. Our Nation’s senior policymakers must think through the long-
range strategic options available to the United States in a world that 
depends on assuring the use of cyberspace. To date, the U.S. Government 
has been implementing traditional approaches to the cybersecurity 
problem—and these measures have not achieved the level of security 
needed. This Initiative is aimed at building an approach to cyber defense 
strategy that deters interference and attack in cyberspace by improving 
warning capabilities, articulating roles for private sector and 
international partners, and developing appropriate responses for both state 
and non-state actors. (Emphasis added.)86 
c. Cyberspace Policy Review (2009) 
In an effort to establish his own administration’s guidance for cyberspace, 
President Obama directed a “clean slate” review assessing U.S. cybersecurity policies.87 
Cybersecurity policy includes: 
Strategy, policy, and standards regarding the security of and operations in 
cyberspace, and encompasses the full range of threat reduction, 
vulnerability reduction, deterrence, international engagement, incident 
response, resiliency, and recovery policies and activities, including 
computer network operations, information assurance, law enforcement, 
diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as they relate to the security 
and stability of the global information and communications infrastructure. 
(Emphasis added.)88 
As a near-term accomplishment, the report specifically recommended the Nation 
should “develop U.S. Government positions for an international cybersecurity policy 
framework and strengthen our international partnerships to create initiatives that address 
the full range of activities, policies, and opportunities associated with cybersecurity.” 
(Emphasis added.)89 
 
                                                 
86 Ibid. 
87 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Cyberspace Policy Review,” 2009, iii, accessed 6 Feb 
2014, http://www.dhs.gov/publication/2009-cyberspace-policy-review. 
88 Ibid., 2. 
89 Ibid., vi. 
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d. National Security Strategy (2010) 
The National Security Strategy (NSS) is prepared by the executive branch to 
outline the key national security concerns of the United States, and how the current 
administration plans to specifically address those concerns. Under Part III, “Advancing 
our Interests,” the NSS states: 
Strengthening Partnerships: Neither government nor the private sector nor 
individual citizens can meet this challenge alone—we will expand the 
ways we work together. We will also strengthen our international 
partnerships on a range of issues, including the development of norms for 
acceptable conduct in cyberspace; laws concerning cybercrime; data 
preservation, protection, and privacy; and approaches for network defense 
and response to cyber attacks. We will work with all the key players— 
including all levels of government and the private sector, nationally and 
internationally—to investigate cyber intrusion and to ensure an organized 
and unified response to future cyber incidents. Just as we do for natural 
disasters, we have to have plans and resources in place beforehand. 
(Emphasis added.)90 
e. U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace (2011) 
This document serves as the U.S.’ first, comprehensive International Strategy for 
Cyberspace. In Part III, “Policy Priorities,” the Strategy reviews Cyberspace policy 
priorities for economic growth, protecting national networks, enhancing law enforcement 
actions, promoting better Internet governance and freedoms, promoting international 
development, and military considerations. Regarding military initiatives, the Strategy 
outlines the following: 
Build and enhance existing military alliances to confront potential 
threats in cyberspace. Cybersecurity cannot be achieved by any one 
nation alone, and greater levels of international cooperation are needed to 
confront those actors who would seek to disrupt or exploit our networks. 
This effort begins by acknowledging that the interconnected nature of 
networked systems of our closest allies, such as those of NATO and its 
member states, creates opportunities and new risks. Moving forward, the 
United States will continue to work with the militaries and civilian 
counterparts of our allies and partners to expand situational awareness 
and shared warning systems, enhance our ability to work together in times 
                                                 
90  The White House, “National Security Strategy,” 2010, accessed 4 Feb 2014, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.  
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of peace and crisis, and develop the means and method of collective self-
defense in cyberspace. Such military alliances and partnerships will 
bolster our collective deterrence capabilities and strengthen our ability to 
defend the U.S. against state and non-state actors. (Emphasis added.)91 
Overall, the International Strategy for Cyberspace establishes a roadmap allowing 
U.S. governments and agencies to better coordinate cyberspace policy with our partner 
nations. It also establishes an invitation to other nations to join in a common vision of 
innovation, interoperability, reliability and security. 
Considering military efforts, “the United States will continue to work with the 
militaries and civilian counterparts of our allies and partners to expand situational 
awareness and shared warning systems, enhance our ability to work together in times of 
peace and crisis, and develop the means and method of collective self-defense in 
cyberspace.”92 
f. PPD-20, U.S. Cyber Operations Policy (2012) 
This classified Presidential Policy Decision (PPD), described in an unclassified 
White House Fact Sheet, “establishes principles and processes for the use of cyberspace 
operations so that cyberspace tools are integrated with the full array of national security 
tools we have at our disposal. The policy provides a whole-of-government approach 
consistent with values we promote domestically and internationally as we have 
previously articulated in the International Strategy for Cyberspace.”93 Later, in an open-
press article, PPD-20 was described as being an 18-page “cyber policy roadmap” for the 
Pentagon that identifies the authority for the U.S. Cyber Command and the JCS to 
employ cyber weapons.94 
                                                 
91  The White House, “Launching the U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace,” 2011, accessed 11 
Feb 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/16/launching-us-international-strategy-cyberspace.  
92 Ibid., 21. 
93  Federation of American Scientists, “Fact Sheet of Presidential Policy Directive 20,” accessed 14 
Jan 2015, http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-20-fs.pdf.  
94 Mark Clayton, “Presidential Cyberwar Directive Gives Pentagon Long-Awaited Marching Orders,” 




2. Department of Defense 
a. National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (2006) 
This classified 54-page document was signed by SecDef in 2006, but was later 
redacted and released in an unclassified version. The National Military Strategy for 
Cyberspace Operations (NMS-CO) was one of the first attempts by DOD to describe the 
cyberspace domain, define cyber threats and vulnerabilities, and provide a strategic 
framework for governmental action. 
The strategy addressed numerous ways to achieve DOD cyberspace goals, one of 
which was “Partnering with International Coalitions.” It stated, in part, “The U.S. must 
build and maintain coalitions that are adaptable and capable of evolving throughout and 
operation. Integrating coalition partners early into the planning process reduces 
operational seams across the coalition and increases the overall success of operations.” 
(Emphasis added.)95 
b. Unified Command Plan (2011) 
Signed by the president, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) is the most strategic, 
foundational military document. Drafted every two years, the Pentagon adjusts its 
missions, responsibilities, and geographic boundaries of each Combatant Command 
based upon each UCP published. Per the current version, U.S. Strategic Command 
(USSTRATCOM) has overall responsibility for conducting critical cyberspace operations 
via their sub-unified command, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).96 
 
 
                                                 
95  Sean Lawson, “DOD’s ‘First’ Cyber Strategy Is Neither First, Nor A Strategy,” Forbes, 1 Aug 
2011, Accessed 13 Jan 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/seanlawson/2011/08/01/dods-first-cyber-
strategy-is-neither-first-nor-a-strategy/  
96  U.S. Department of Defense, “Unified Command Plan,” 2011, accessed 14 Jan 2015, 
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=14398.  
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c. National Military Strategy (2011) 
The unclassified National Military Strategy (NMS) serves as the means for the 
CJCS to provide “the best military advice”97 to the Nation’s leadership, and outlines the 
ways and means by which the U.S. military advances the Nation’s enduring national 
interests: 
This strategy outlines three broad themes: First, in supporting national 
efforts to address complex security challenges, the Joint Force’s leadership 
approach is often as important as the military capabilities we provide. 
Second, the changing security environment requires the Joint Force to 
deepen security relationships with our allies and create opportunities for 
partnerships with new and divers groups of actors. And third, our Joint 
Force must prepare for an increasingly dynamic and uncertain future in 
which a full spectrum of military capabilities and attributes will be 
required to prevent and win our Nation’s wars. 
Cyberspace capabilities enable Combatant Commanders to operate 
effectively across all domains. Strategic Command and Cyber Command 
will collaborate with U.S. government agencies, nongovernment entities, 
industry, and international actors to develop new cyber norms, 
capabilities, organizations, and skills. Should a large-scale cyber intrusion 
or debilitating cyber attack occur, we must provide abroad range of 
options to ensure our access and use of the cyberspace domain and hold 
malicious actors accountable. (Emphasis added.)98 
Finally, “Joint Forces will secure the ‘.mil’ domain, requiring a resilient DOD 
cyberspace enterprise that employs detection, deterrence, denial, and multi-layered 
defense.”99 (Thus, DOD is chartered to focus on the “.mil” domain, while DHS focuses 
on the broader “.gov” domain.) 
 
 
                                                 
97  U.S. Department of Defense, “Chairman’s Corner: 2011 National Military Strategy,” accessed 13 
Jan 2015, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=62736.  
98 Ibid., 10. 
99 Ibid., 19. 
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d. CJCS Volume VI Emergency Action Procedures (2012) 
Whenever there is a national military emergency, all appropriate military and 
federal agencies are gathered together on a classified conference call to review the 
current situation and discuss the way ahead. These conferences are guided by the 
Emergency Action Procedures of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume VI, 
“Emergency Conferences.” In the latest version, Commander USCYBERCOM is 
identified as being the deciding authority for assessing if a “Cyberspace Attack” has 
occurred, is occurring, or is imminent.100 
e. Joint Publication 3–12, Cyberspace Operations (2013) 
As outlined in the unclassified, releasable version, this publication states: 
In support of Unified Command Plan-assigned missions, 
CDRUSSTRATCOM: 
(a) Coordinates with the [intelligence community], [Combatant 
Commanders], Services, agencies, and allied partners to facilitate 
development of improved cyberspace access to support planning and 
operations. 
(b) Provides shared [situational awareness] of [cyberspace operations or 
CO] and [Indications & Warning.] 
(c) Provides military representation to U.S. national agencies, U.S. 
commercial entities, and international agencies for cyberspace matters, as 






                                                 
100  U.S. Department of Defense, “CJCS Conferencing Systems,” 3 Feb 2012, accessed 14 Jan 2015, 
http://dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3420_01.pdf.  
101 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication  3–12R (Releasable), “Cyberspace Operations,”      
5 Feb 2013, III-5, accessed 14 Jun 2015, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_12R.pdf. 
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This publication discusses cyberspace operations conducted in cooperation with 
allied nations: “Regardless of what elements are established, the overlaps between global 
and theater missions in cyberspace, and the constraints and restraints on personnel 
conducting CO, necessitate close coordination between the [Combatant Commander], 
CDRUSSTRATCOM, and other allied and interagency partners for the effective 
synchronization of CO.” (Emphasis added.)102  
Finally, the strategy warns: “Security restrictions may prevent full disclosure of 
individual CO plans and orders with multinational partners; this may severely hamper 
cyberspace synchronization efforts. Therefore, the JFC’s staff should obtain approval for 
information sharing among partners, and then issue specific guidance on the release of 
classified U.S. material to the multinational force as early as possible during planning.” 
(Emphasis added.)103  
D. CANADIAN NATIONAL CYBERSPACE GUIDANCE 
1. Executive Branch 
a. Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy (2010) 
This strategy is the Canadian government’s plan for meeting the cyberspace 
threat, and delivers on the government’s commitment to implement a cyberspace strategy 
to protect Canada’s digital infrastructure. It acts as a cornerstone of the government’s 
commit to keep Canada, including their cyberspace, safe, secure, and prosperous. 
b. Action Plan 2010–2015 (2013) 
This document outlines the Canadian government’s plan to implement the Cyber 
Security Strategy and meet the ultimate goal of securing Canada’s cyberspace for the 
benefit of Canadians and their economy. The Action Plan than outlines thirty specific 
actions to take, the required deliverables, and the lead agencies involved, all coordinated 
to meet the three pillars outlined in the Cyber Security Strategy. 
                                                 
102 Ibid., IV-9. 
103 Ibid., IV-14. 
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2. Department of National Defence 
a. Canada First Defence Strategy (2013) 
This strategy sets a detailed road-map for the modernization of the Canadian 
military forces. Under “Defending North America,” the strategy states, “Given our 
common defence and security requirements, it is in Canada’s strategic interest to remain a 
reliable partner in the defence of the continent. Canadian Forces will continue to 
collaborate with the U.S. counterparts as partners in NORAD…NORAD is also evolving 
to meet future threats…Finally, the two nation’s armed forces will pursue their effective 
collaboration on operations in North America and abroad.” (Emphasis added.)104 
b. Canadian Forces Cyber Operations Primer (2014) 
The purpose of this Primer is to describe Cyber Operations from a Canadian 
Armed Forces (CAF) perspective, and outlines the operational functions in the Cyber 
environment, those being Command, Sense, Act, Shield, and Sustain. Under the 
“Sustain” function, the Primer states, “Sustaining the Force requires the CAF to engage 
in a wide range of multi-national political/military alliances and arrangements (i.e., Five-
Eyes, NATO, NORAD.)” (Emphasis added.)105  
E. SUMMARY 
Over the course of 50 years, NORAD has repeatedly reassessed, redefined, and 
updated its core operational missions based upon a constantly evolving threat. The 
NORAD Agreement clearly reflects both Nation’s desire that NORAD be able to adapt 
and defend against newly evolving military threats which each nation may jointly face: 
 
 
                                                 
104 Canadian Department of National Defence, “Canada First Defence Strategy, accessed 15 Jan 2015, 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/canada-first-defence-strategy.page. 
105 Canadian Department of National Defence, “Canadian Armed Forces Cyber Operations Primer,” 
Feb 2014, 6. 
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MINDFUL that in the years since the first NORAD Agreement was 
concluded on May 12, 1958, NORAD, as a distinct command, has evolved 
to address the continuing changes in the nature of the threats to North 
America and that it will need to continue to adapt to future shared security 
interests. (Emphasis added.)106  
As has been shown, numerous U.S. national strategies recommend working with 
international organizations to develop international watch-and-warning networks in order 
to detect and prevent cyber attacks. For example, the Cyberspace Policy Review 
recommended the U.S. develop international cybersecurity frameworks and partnerships, 
while the NSS recommended expanding international partnerships regarding network 
defense and response to cyber attack. 
From a U.S. military cyberspace strategy perspective, the NMS-CO identified the 
need to integrate allies early in the planning process to ensure mission success. One of its 
three broad themes stressed the need to deepen security relationships with our allies. 
Finally, from a Canadian perspective, both Canada’s civilian and military 
strategies mirror these same themes of working with international organizations to 
develop international watch-and-warning networks in order to detect and prevent cyber 
attacks. CAF will continue to collaborate with the U.S. counterparts as partners in 
NORAD as it evolves to meet future threats while pursuing effective collaboration on 
operations in North America and abroad. 
In summary, the U.S. and Canada strategic cyberspace guidance all propose a 
closer working arrangement between each country as both deal with growing cyberspace 
threats. These documents significantly inform the discussion regarding NORAD potential 
new role in cyberspace threat information and attack assessment. 
 
 
                                                 
106106   North American Aerospace Defense Command, “NORAD Agreement,” accessed 3 Feb 2014, 
http://www.norad.mil/AboutNORAD/NORADAgreement.aspx.  
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IV. COURSES OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT 
A. METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this chapter is to present potential courses of action (COAs) for 
NORAD consideration regarding possible roles the Command might play in future 
military cyber attack warnings. Each of the three selected COAs met all five of the 
following validity criteria used by the Department of Defense: 
 Adequate. Can accomplish the mission within the commander’s guidance. 
 Feasible. Can accomplish the mission within the established time, space, 
and resource limitations. 
 Acceptable. Must balance cost and risk with advantage gained. 
 Distinguishable. Must be sufficiently different from other COAs. 
 Complete. Does it answer who, what, where, when, how and why?107 
The author used existing documentation and dialogue with NORAD, 
USNORTHCOM, USCYBERCOM, and Canadian military cyberspace practitioners. 
Because much of the cyber mission is currently evolving, it was necessary to extract 
cyber policy related to NORAD from current joint doctrine and actual cyberspace 
operations. Formal interviews or surveys were not used.   
Numerous COAs were then analyzed and discarded. (Rejected COAs included 
NORAD developing its own definition of “cyber attack,” outsourcing all NORAD cyber 
warning functions to USCYBERCOM, and Commander NORAD conducting his own 
unilateral cyber attack assessments.) Eventually, three reasonable COAs emerged. They 
were sequentially arranged by increasing levels of responsibility being placed upon 
NORAD, and were then examined for their specific advantages, disadvantages, and levels 
of difficulty in their implementation. 
                                                 
107 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5–0, “Joint Operation Planning,” 11 Aug 2011,   
IV-24 through IV-36, accessed 21 Apr 2015, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf. 
 56
B. COA #1 DESCRIPTION (FULL NORAD CYBER CONFERENCE 
PARTICIPATION) 
1. Definition 
Under this COA, NORAD’s role would be to fully participate in all cyberspace 
event conferences in order to increase the Command’s internal situational awareness 
regarding in-progress, military-related cyber events. 
2. Discussion 
NORAD currently participates in “Cyber Watch Conferences” which provide 
cyber technicians a standardized venue to discuss and troubleshoot detected system 
anomalies. However, during advanced “Cyber Event Conferences” and “National Event 
Conferences,” practitioners report Canadian participation is denied approximately 50 
percent of the time due to discussions involving non-releasable (US-only) classified 
cyberspace compartmented information. 
Accomplishing this COA eliminates those restrictions, makes classified cyber 
event information fully available to appropriate Canadian military personnel, and 
improves NORAD’s own cyberspace situational awareness and ability to gauge any 
associated mission impacts. 
3. Advantages 
 Allows full cyber event information exchange to both U.S. and Canadian 
personnel assigned to NORAD. 
 Enables NORAD full situational awareness regarding cyber events that 
might affect the NORAD warning and control missions. 
 Uses existing technical conference procedures.  
 Does not change existing relationships with USCYBERCOM. 
 Does not require a change in the NORAD Agreement and/or Terms of 
Reference negotiated between the U.S. and Canada. 
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4. Disadvantages and Proposed Solutions 
 Some classified cyberspace threat information and technical “tactics, 
techniques, and procedures” (TTPs) are not currently releasable to Canadian personnel. 
(Change DOD classification guidance to allow Canadians full access to cyberspace threat 
information and TTPs.) 
 NORAD regional headquarters currently must drop off threat conferences 
during classified discussions. (Change DOD conference procedures to allow NORAD 
regional headquarters to remain on cyber event conferences during classified 
discussions.) 
 Modifies existing conference checklist procedures. (Modify cyberspace 
conference checklists to reflect full NORAD participation.) 
C. COA #2 DESCRIPTION (NORAD ALL-DOMAIN WARNING 
PRODUCTION) 
1. Definition 
Under this COA, NORAD’s role would be to fuse applicable North America 
military-related cyber event information with current NORAD aerospace and maritime 
operational information to produce all-domain warnings to the U.S. and Canadian 
governments. 
2. Discussion 
Assuming the issue of releasing classified cyber event information to NORAD 
Canadians was successfully resolved (proposed in COA #1), this COA directs NORAD 
to fuse military cyber event information with current aerospace and maritime warning 
information to produce timely, all-domain warnings to the U.S. and Canadian 
governments using existing NORAD binational military relationships and established 
warning processes. This COA would allow Canadian cyber forces to become involved in 
the NORAD notification process. As technical cyber event information would initially be 
analyzed by USCYBERCOM, then provided to NORAD for further amalgamation, there 
would be no change to the existing relationships between the two commands. 
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3. Advantages 
 Allows full cyber event information exchange to both U.S. and Canadian 
personnel assigned to NORAD. 
 Enables NORAD full situational awareness regarding cyber events that 
might affect the NORAD warning and control missions. 
 Uses existing technical conference procedures. 
 Does not change existing relationships with USCYBERCOM. 
 Directs NORAD to fuse military cyber event information with current 
aerospace and maritime warning information to produce an all-domain characterization. 
 Uses proven, legacy NORAD binational relationships and procedures to 
provide immediate all-domain warning updates to both the U.S. and Canadian military 
command structures. 
4. Disadvantages and Proposed Solutions 
 Some classified cyberspace threat information and technical TTPs are not 
currently releasable to Canadian personnel. (Change DOD classification guidance to 
allow Canadians full access to cyberspace threat information and technical TTPs.) 
 NORAD regional headquarters currently must drop off threat conferences 
during classified SCI discussions. (Change DOD conference procedures to allow 
NORAD regional headquarters to remain on cyber event conferences during classified 
discussions.) 
 Modifies existing conference checklist procedures. (Modify cyberspace 
conference checklists to reflect NORAD fusing and dissemination of all-domain warning 
updates to both the U.S. and Canada.) 
 Requires training NORAD personnel to fuse and disseminate all-domain 
warning updates. (Build new training program for NORAD personnel to fuse and 
disseminate all-domain warning updates.) 
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 Requires negotiating new cyberspace defense and response policies 
between the U.S. and Canada. (Negotiate new cyberspace defense and response policies 
between the U.S. and Canada, if required.) 
 Requires a change in NORAD Agreement and/or Terms of Reference 
between both Governments. (Negotiate change to NORAD Agreement and/or Terms of 
References between the U.S. and Canada, if required.) 
D. COA #3 DESCRIPTION (JOINT NORAD + USCYBERCOM CYBER 
ATTACK ASSESSMENT) 
1. Definition 
Under this COA, NORAD’s role would involve CDRNORAD and 
CDRUSCYBERCOM to conducting a combined formal cyber attack assessment, if such 
an attack was believed to be in progress. 
2. Discussion 
Again, assuming the releasability of classified cyber event information (proposed 
in COA #1) was successfully accomplished, this COA would require joint concurrence 
regarding a cyber attack assessment. While CDRUSCYBERCOM understands the 
technical cyberspace issues involved during a cyber attack, CDRNORAD has the 
operational responsibility to provide aerospace and maritime attack warning for North 
America to the civilian military leadership of both Nations. Providing a joint assessment 
would strengthen the validity of such an evaluation. 
3. Advantages 
 Allows full cyber event information exchange to both U.S. and Canadian 
personnel assigned to NORAD. 
 Enables NORAD full situational awareness regarding cyber events that 
might affect the NORAD warning and control missions. 
 Uses existing technical conference procedures. 
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 Leverages USCYBERCOM’s global cyberspace visibility, technical 
infrastructure, and cyberspace expertise to accomplish an official cyber attack 
assessment. 
 Leverages NORAD’s visibility on current air defense operations and 
aerospace/maritime warning expertise to ascertain any effects on NORAD operations. 
4. Disadvantages and Proposed Solutions 
 Some classified cyberspace threat information and technical TTPs are not 
currently releasable to Canadian personnel. (Change DOD classification guidance to 
allow Canadians full access to cyberspace threat information and technical TTPs.) 
 NORAD regional headquarters currently must drop off threat conferences 
during classified discussions. (Change DOD conference procedures to allow NORAD 
regional headquarters to remain on cyber event conferences during classified 
discussions.) 
 Modifies existing conference checklist procedures. (Modify cyberspace 
conference checklists to reflect joint CDRUSCYBERCOM/CDRNORAD cyber attack 
assessment.) 
 Requires training NORAD General Officers for new cyber attack 
assessment coordination responsibility.(Build new training program for NORAD General 
Officer joint cyber attack assessment responsibility.) 
 Changes existing relationships with USCYBERCOM. (Negotiate new 
command arrangements agreement between NORAD and USCYBERCOM.) 
 Requires negotiating new cyberspace defense and response policies 
between the U.S. and Canada. (Negotiate new cyberspace defense and response policies 
between the U.S. and Canada, if required.) 
 Requires changing the NORAD Agreement and/or Terms of References. 
(Negotiate change to NORAD Agreement and/or Terms of Reference, if required.) 
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E. SUMMARY 
This chapter identified three general COAs regarding possible roles NORAD 
might play in future military cyber attack warning situations. Each proposed COA was 
initially analyzed to ensure it met specific validity criteria (e.g., adequate, feasible, 
acceptable, distinguishable, and complete.) COAs were then arranged by increasing 
levels of responsibility being placed upon NORAD. Each COA was then examined for 
specific advantages. Finally, each COA was then examined for specific disadvantages, 












V. COURSES OF ACTION ANALYSIS 
A. METHODOLOGY 
Three general courses of action (COAs) were identified regarding possible roles 
NORAD might play in future military cyber attack warning. These COAs were arranged 
by increasing levels of responsibilities being placed upon NORAD. Advantages were 
listed to allow the reader a broad appreciation of the operational benefits each COA 
might offer. 
Next, in order to gauge to what extent a proposed COA was practical to 
implement, disadvantages were listed with corresponding proposed solutions. These 
proposed solutions were then standardized across all COAs to allow for uniform 
comparison.108  
Using inputs from cyberspace subject matter experts, each proposed solution was 
then weighted for its general difficulty in implementation, with a score of either: 
 “1” (Routine; requires normal NORAD internal staff actions.) 
 “2” (Challenging; requires detailed, U.S. government-wide staff actions.)  
 “3” (Difficult; requires politically sensitive binational staff actions.) 
Finally, all weighted factors were then summed to present a total score for 
consideration. The COA which presented the greatest apparent advantages and the lowest 
disadvantages score was presumed to be the best COA for NORAD to pursue. 
Overall, this methodology (while not strictly scientific) provides the reader a 
general measure of the effectiveness and cost of implementation for each proposed COA. 
(Before any COA might be adopted, it is suggested a full military COA analysis be 
conducted, to include surveys and/or interviews with cyberspace practitioners.) 
This chapter concludes with a summary table identifying all COAs, their proposed 
solutions and weights, and their specific scorings. 
                                                 
108  Morgan D. Jones, The Thinker’s Toolkit, New York, NY, Crown Publishing Group, 30 Jun 1998, 
chapters 4 and 10. 
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B. COA #1 ANALYSIS (FULL NORAD CYBER CONFERENCE 
PARTICIPATION) 
1. Advantages, Disadvantages and Weighted Scoring 
 Allows full cyber event information exchange to both U.S. and Canadian 
personnel assigned to NORAD. 
 Enables NORAD full situational awareness regarding cyber events that 
might affect the NORAD warning and control missions. 
 Uses existing technical conference procedures.  
 Does not change existing relationships with USCYBERCOM. 
 Does not require a change in the NORAD Agreement and/or Terms of 
Reference negotiated between the U.S. and Canada. 
 




Modify cyberspace conference checklists to 
reflect full NORAD participation. 1 
Some classified 
cyberspace threat 
information and technical 
TTPs are not currently 
releasable to Canadian 
personnel. 
Change DOD classification guidance to 
allow Canadians full access to cyberspace 
threat information and technical TTPs. 2 
NORAD regional 
headquarters currently 
must drop off threat 
conferences during 
classified discussions. 
Change DOD conference procedures to 
allow NORAD regional headquarters to 
remain on cyber event conferences during 
classified discussions. 
2 





Table 2.   COA #1 Scoring Summary. 
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2. COA #1 Synopsis 
COA #1 is a promising first step. (In fact, NORAD and USNORTHCOM staffs 
are currently attempting to obtain DOD approval to release classified technical 
cyberspace information to Canadian NORAD members for the very reasons outlined in 
the COA rationale.) 
Overall, this would seem to be a realistic, achievable COA that offers significant 
improvement in NORAD cyber attack situational awareness and operational effectiveness 
at a cost of only an administrative change in DOD information classification policy. 
Releasing classified cyberspace information to all NORAD personnel, and 
allowing NORAD regional headquarters to remain on cyber event conferences, also 
mirrors current U.S. national policies which repeatedly highlight the need for greater U.S. 
cooperation and information sharing with our international allies. 
This COA is also in keeping with the spirit of the NORAD agreement, where the 
Command remains in the situational awareness business, yet can be responsive to any 
cyberspace actions being undertaken by USCYBERCOM. 
Under this COA, existing classified cyber event conferences would continue as 
normal. However, updated internal NORAD operational checklists would be required to 
fully capitalize on new cyber attack warning information now being available to NORAD 
personnel from such cyberspace conference attendance. 
After reviewing the advantages, disadvantages and potential solutions for 
implementing this COA, a weighted implementation score of “5” would seem to indicate 
few major roadblocks to overcome. 
Overall, while requiring several “challenging” staff actions through DOD to 
accomplish the desired releasability goal, this COA would enable greater information 
exchange between allies, would provide greater cyberspace situational awareness to 
NORAD, and would help Commander NORAD make more knowledgeable assessments 
regarding any potential attack upon North America. 
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C. COA #2 ANALYSIS (NORAD ALL-DOMAIN WARNING PRODUCTION) 
1. Advantages, Disadvantages and Weighted Scoring 
 Allows full cyber event information exchange to both U.S. and Canadian 
personnel assigned to NORAD. 
 Enables NORAD full situational awareness regarding cyber events that 
might affect the NORAD warning and control missions. 
 Uses existing technical conference procedures. 
 Does not change existing relationships with USCYBERCOM. 
 Directs NORAD to fuse military cyber event information with current 
aerospace and maritime warning information to produce an all-domain characterization. 
 Uses proven, legacy NORAD binational relationships and warning 
procedures to provide immediate all-domain warning updates to both the U.S. and 
Canadian military command structures. 
 




Modify cyberspace conference checklists to 
reflect NORAD fusing and dissemination of all-





information and technical 
TTPs are not currently 
releasable to Canadian 
personnel. 
Change DOD classification guidance to allow 
Canadians full access to cyberspace threat 
information and technical TTPs. 2 
NORAD regional 
headquarters currently 
must drop off threat 
conferences during 
classified discussions. 
Change DOD conference procedures to allow 
NORAD regional headquarters to remain on 




NORAD personnel to 
fuse and disseminate all-
domain warning updates. 
Build new training program for NORAD 
personnel to fuse and disseminate all-domain 
warning updates. 2 
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Requires negotiating new 
cyberspace defense and 
response policies between 
the U.S. and Canada. 
Negotiate new cyberspace defense and response 
policies between the U.S. and Canada, if 
required. 3 
Requires a change in the 
NORAD Agreement and/
or Terms of Reference. 
Negotiate change to NORAD Agreement or 
Terms of Reference, if required. 3 
 SCORE 13 
2. COA #2 Synopsis 
COA #2 proposes a much more active role for NORAD, assuming the issue 
regarding the releasability of classified cyber event information to Canadian personnel 
(proposed under COA #1) has been successfully resolved. It directs the Command to fuse 
military cyber event information with existing aerospace and maritime warning 
information to produce timely, all-domain warnings to U.S. and Canada national civilian 
leadership using current NORAD binational military relationships and established 
warning processes. 
While USCYBERCOM currently provides specific cyber event updates directly 
to military command centers, having NORAD produce a broader, all-domain warning 
products to both the U.S. and Canada would help both nations have a better appreciation 
the effect a cyber event might have had on North American defenses. 
Under this COA, existing classified cyber event conferences continue as normal 
and capitalize on information now being fully available to all NORAD personnel. 
Updated internal operational checklists would be required to reflect NORAD fusing and 
dissemination of all-domain warnings to both Nations. Also, a new training program 
would have to be built to train NORAD personnel on producing and disseminating all-
domain warning products. 
As cyber event formation would initially be analyzed by USCYBERCOM, then 
provided to NORAD for further consideration, there would be no change to the existing 
relationships between the two commands. 
Table 3.   COA #2 Scoring Summary. 
 68
Also, because this would be a major change to NORAD’s legacy missions and 
processes, new cyberspace defense and response policies might have to be negotiated 
between the U.S. and Canada to ensure NORAD has the correct mission authority. 
Following such binational negotiations, the NORAD Agreement and /or Terms of 
References would also need updating through international staffing channels. 
After reviewing the advantages, disadvantages and potential solutions for 
implementing this COA, a weighted implementation score of “13” would seem to 
indicate several major roadblocks to overcome, mostly in the need to negotiate new 
international agreements between the U.S. and Canada. 
Overall, while requiring both “challenging” and “difficult” staff actions both 
within DOD and internationally with Canada, this COA harnesses proven NORAD 
binational relationships and warning procedures to provide all-domain warning updates to 
both nations. 
D. COA #3 ANALYSIS (JOINT NORAD + USCYBERCOM CYBER ATTACK 
ASSESSMENT) 
1. Advantages, Disadvantages and Weighted Scoring 
 Allows full cyber event information exchange to both U.S. and Canadian 
personnel assigned to NORAD. 
 Enables NORAD full situational awareness regarding cyber events that 
might affect the NORAD warning and control missions. 
 Uses existing technical conference procedures. 
 Leverages USCYBERCOM’s global cyberspace visibility, technical 
infrastructure, and cyberspace expertise to accomplish an official cyber attack 
assessment. 
 Leverages NORAD’s visibility on current air defense operations and 
aerospace/maritime warning expertise to ascertain any effects on NORAD operations. 
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Modify cyberspace conference checklists to 
reflect joint CDRUSCYBERCOM / 





technical TTPs are not 
currently releasable to 
Canadian personnel. 
Change DOD classification guidance to allow 
Canadians full access to cyberspace threat 
information and technical TTPs. 2 
NORAD regional 
headquarters currently 
must drop off threat 
conferences during 
classified discussions. 
Change DOD conference procedures to allow 
NORAD regional headquarters to remain on 









Build new training program for NORAD 





Negotiate new command arrangements 




new cyberspace defense 
and response policies 
between the U.S. and 
Canada. 
Negotiate new cyberspace defense and response 
policies between the U.S. and Canada, if 
required. 3 
Requires changing the 
NORAD Agreement and 
/or Terms of Reference 
between both 
governments. 
Negotiate change to NORAD Agreement and/or 
Terms of Reference between both governments, 
if required. 3 




Table 4.   COA #3 Scoring Summary. 
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2. COA #3 Synopsis 
COA #3 is the most active NORAD option. Again, assuming the release of 
classified cyber event information to Canadian personnel (proposed under COA #1) has 
been successfully accomplished, this COA proposes a major change in current U.S. cyber 
attack assessment procedures. 
While USCYBERCOM has strong technical understanding and global visibility 
of cyberspace activities, they often lack detailed insight into current operations being 
conducted by global combatant commands. Under this COA, this deficit would be 
alleviated for North American air defense operations by directing NORAD to jointly 
participate in all North American-related cyber attack assessments. Commander NORAD 
would bring an awareness of on-going continental air defense operations, would provide 
essential operational expertise when adjudicating proposed cyberspace attack 
assessments, and could evaluate what effects any proposed follow-on cyberspace actions 
might have on current NORAD operations.  
Some staffs have argued this COA is not required, as Commander 
USNORTHCOM (dual-hatted as Commander NORAD) already has the authority to 
declare a “Domestic Attack Assessment” if he judges the U.S. is under attack. Already 
having this authority would seem to obviate the need for him to assume an additional 
cyber attack assessment responsibility. However, his role as Commander 
USNORTHCOM does not specifically involve cyberspace operations, only involves U.S. 
military responsibilities, and does not involve notifications to the Canadian government 
which automatically occur within the binational NORAD structure. 
Another concern voiced is allowing another commander to participate in the cyber 
attack assessment process. One could argue if Commander NORAD needs to participate 
in North American-related cyber events, then should not Commander European 
Command participate in European-related cyber events, or Commander Pacific 
Command participate in cyber events occurring in Asia? Once the USCYBERCOM 
assessment process is opened to other geographic combatant commanders, does not this 
become a very slippery slope? 
 71
Under this COA, existing classified cyber event conferences continue as normal. 
Updated internal NORAD operational checklists would be required to reflect joint 
CDRCYBERCOM and CDRNORAD participation in all cyber attack assessments. Also, 
a new training program would have to be built to train NORAD General Officers on their 
new joint assessment responsibility. 
Also, if this COA were to be implemented, a new “Command Arrangements 
Agreement” between NORAD and USCYBERCOM would need to be negotiated to 
clearly outline the new cyber attack assessment responsibilities of each commander. 
Further, because this would be a major change to NORAD’s legacy missions and 
processes, new cyberspace defense and response policies might have to be negotiated 
between the U.S. and Canada to ensure NORAD has the correct mission authority. 
Following such binational negotiations, the NORAD Agreement and /or Terms of 
References would also need updating through international staffing channels. 
After reviewing the advantages, disadvantages and potential solutions for 
implementing this COA, a weighted implementation score of “15” would seem to 
indicate several major roadblocks to overcome, mostly in the need to negotiate 
international agreements between the U.S. and Canada, and new command agreements 
between NORAD and USCYBERCOM.  
Overall, while requiring both “challenging” and “difficult” staff actions both 
within DOD and internationally with Canada, this COA combines the advantages which 
both NORAD and USCYBERCOM offer to the cyber attack assessment process. 
E. COA ANALYSIS COMPARISON 
Using inputs from cyberspace subject matter experts, each COA proposed 
implementation solutions which were weighted using an increasing score of either: 
 “1” (Routine; requires normal NORAD internal staff actions.) 
 “2” (Challenging; requires detailed, U.S. government-wide staff actions.)  
 “3” (Difficult; requires politically sensitive binational staff actions.) 
 72
All weighted factors were then summed to present a total COA score for 
consideration. The COA which presented the greatest apparent advantages and the lowest 
disadvantages score was presumed to be the best COA for NORAD to pursue. 
Table 5 summarizes all three COAs, their proposed solutions and implementation 
weights, and their specific total scorings: 
 
  COA 1 COA 2 COA 3 

















to reflect full 
NORAD 
participation. 
1 1   
Modify cyberspace 
conference checklists 
to reflect NORAD 
fusing and 
dissemination of all-
domain warnings to 
both the U.S. and 
Canada. 
1  1  
Modify cyberspace 
conference checklists 
to reflect joint 
CDRUSCYBERCO
M / CDRNORAD 
cyber attack 
assessment. 
1   1 
Change DOD 
classification 
guidance to allow 
Canadians full access 









procedures to allow 
NORAD regional 
headquarters to 




2 2 2 2 
Build new training 
program for NORAD 




2  2  
Build new training 
program for NORAD 











2   2 
Negotiate new 
cyberspace defense 
and response policies 
between the U.S. and 
Canada, if required. 
3  3 3 
Change NORAD 
Agreement and/or 
Terms of Reference, 
if required. 
3  3 3 




Table 5.   COA Analysis Summary. 
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VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. FINDINGS 
This thesis began with an examination of NORAD’s history of evolving to meet 
new military defense challenges. It also examined cyber warfare components and 
evolving definitions, key U.S. and Canadian military cyber organizations, and current 
cyberspace national event conferences. With the dramatic increase in world-wide 
cyberspace events, it was noted NORAD has begun examining its own potential role in 
this new operational domain.  
This thesis then examined current NORAD, U.S. and Canadian strategic guidance 
relating to cyberspace operations. Both the NORAD Agreement clearly reflect both 
Nation’s desire that NORAD be able to adapt and defend against newly evolving military 
threats which each nation may jointly face. Likewise, numerous U.S. government 
strategies recommend working with international organizations to develop watch-and-
warning networks in order to detect and prevent cyber attacks. Further, U.S. military 
cyberspace policies identify the need to integrate coalition partners early into planning 
processes and thus increase the overall success of combined operations. Finally, from a 
Canadian perspective, both their civilian and military strategies mirror these same themes 
of working with international organizations to develop international watch-and-warning 
networks in order to detect and prevent cyber attacks. In summary, both U.S. and Canada 
strategic cyberspace guidance propose a closer working arrangement between each 
country as a means of dealing with growing cyberspace threats. These documents 
significantly inform the discussion regarding NORAD potential new role in cyberspace 
threat information and attack assessment. 
With this policy background in mind, three courses of action (COAs) were 
eventually developed regarding possible roles NORAD might play in future military 
cyber attack warning situations. Each proposed COA was initially analyzed to ensure it 
met specific validity criteria. They were then examined for specific advantages, 
disadvantages, and possible solutions (each generally weighted for implementation). 
 76
COA #1 proposes NORAD advocate for full national cyberspace conference 
participation. Overall, this would seem to be a realistic, achievable first step that offers 
significant improvement in NORAD cyber attack situational awareness and improved 
operational responsiveness requiring only a change in DOD information classification 
policy. Allowing NORAD Canadian personnel to fully participate in cyber event 
conferences also mirrors current U.S. national policies which repeatedly highlight the 
need for greater U.S. and Canadian cooperation and information sharing with between 
allies. After reviewing the advantages, disadvantages and potential solutions for 
implementing this COA, a weighted implementation score of “5” seems to indicate few 
major roadblocks to overcome. 
In general, while requiring several “challenging” staff actions through DOD to 
accomplish the desired releasability goal, this COA would enable greater information 
exchange between allies, would provide greater cyberspace situational awareness to 
NORAD, and would help Commander NORAD make more knowledgeable assessments 
regarding any potential attack upon North America. 
COA #2 proposes NORAD produce all-domain warnings using its legacy 
binational military relationships and warning processes. This proposes a much more 
active role for NORAD, necessitating a new program to train NORAD personnel on 
producing all-domain warning products. While USCYBERCOM would continue to 
provide cyber event updates directly to military command centers, NORAD would 
produce broader, all-domain warnings to help both nations have a better appreciation the 
effect cyber events might have on North American defenses. COA analysis revealed a 
solution score of “13,” indicating several major roadblocks to overcome, mostly in the 
need to negotiate new international agreements between the U.S. and Canada. 
Overall, while requiring “challenging” and “difficult” staff actions within DOD 
and internationally with Canada, this COA harnesses proven NORAD binational 
relationships and warning procedures to provide all-domain warnings to both nations. 
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Finally, COA #3 proposes a joint NORAD and USCYBERCOM cyber attack 
assessment concept. This would be a major change for both NORAD and the U.S. 
cyberspace community, as well. This COA argues while USCYBERCOM has strong 
technical understanding and global visibility of cyberspace activities, they often lack 
detailed insight into current operations being conducted by global combatant commands. 
Under this COA, this deficit would be alleviated for North American air defense 
operations by directing NORAD to jointly participate in all North American-related cyber 
attack assessments.  
However, a strong argument against this COA concerns opening up the attack 
assessment role to all geographic commanders. Thus, it could be argued if Commander 
NORAD needs to participate in North American-related cyber events, then Commander 
European Command should participate in European-related cyber events, and 
Commander Pacific Command should participate in cyber events occurring in Asia. 
Further, as this would be a major change to NORAD’s legacy missions, new 
cyberspace defense and response policies would need to be negotiated between the U.S. 
and Canada to ensure NORAD has correct mission authority. Following such binational 
negotiations, the NORAD Agreement and Terms of References would also need updating 
through international staffing channels. After reviewing the advantages, disadvantages 
and potential solutions for implementing this COA, a weighted score of “15” indicates 
several major roadblocks to be overcome, to include negotiating new international 
agreements between the U.S. and Canada, and the need to develop a new NORAD 
General Officer cyber attack assessment training program.   
Overall, while requiring both “challenging” and “difficult” staff actions both 
within DOD and internationally with Canada, this COA combines the advantages which 






As the COAs were being developed, it became apparent they were not mutually 
exclusive, but in fact all of these COAs could potentially be adopted sequentially over the 
course of several years.  
COA #1 offers a major improvement in cyber situational awareness at little 
implementation cost. The difficulty will be in convincing DOD the need to change its 
administrative policies regarding the sharing of classified cyberspace operational 
information with Canadian military personnel. This would not be a trivial endeavor. 
However, this thesis has highlighted numerous strategic policies which emphasize the 
need to share this type of information with international partners, and NORAD Canadians 
are clearly one of the longest and most enduring allies to the U.S. Overall, this COA 
would seem to be the easiest to implement while significantly improving NORAD’s 
cyber situational awareness. 
Later, as cyberspace information sharing with Canadians becomes routine, 
NORAD could reevaluate whether it is militarily desirable to pursue COA #2. This would 
be a subjective evaluation by the NORAD, USCYBERCOM, and other cyberspace 
information users to determine if there was value added in NORAD producing all-domain 
fused warnings. While COA analysis shows this to involve both “challenging” and 
“difficult” staff actions, a broader question might be “is there a real customer need?” 
Finally, COA #3 may be militarily undesirable. Having Commander NORAD 
directly involved with North American cyber attack assessments seemed reasonable, but 
COA analysis showed many roadblocks to success. Further, the “challenging” task of 
negotiating new CAAs between NORAD and USCYBERCOM might then generate the 
need to develop similar CAAs between USCYBERCOM and USEUCOM, USPACOM, 
etc. This greatly expands the overall impact of this COA, probably making this policy 
option “a bridge too far.”  
In conclusion, with global cyber attacks on the rise, it seems reasonable NORAD 
should explore potential new roles for cyber attack warning. This thesis recommends that 
the NORAD staff consider COA #1 first. 
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